This Special Issue of the Journal of Strategic Security (JSS) presents the results of a series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to engage in complex engineering tasks, in the hope of informing strategic assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies.
threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies. The introductory article defines a complex engineering effort, summarizes the existing literature on the topic and sets out the methodology and framing questions used in the case studies.
Disclaimer
Editor's Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors. Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases.
Introduction
Among the many global dynamics rising to the fore in the 21 st century, two of the most prominent are the growth in the systemic influence of terrorists and other violent non-state actors (VNSAs), and the advent of a range of transformational technologies. In the context of international security, there is particular concern with respect to the nexus of these two forces, where it is feared that VNSAs might adopt emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology or quantum computing, to magnify the threat that they pose.
On the one hand, it is tempting to inflate the threat, painting VNSAs as Bondian-supervillians capable of casually constructing doomsday weapons, while ignoring the multiple hurdles inherent in such enterprises and the empirical fact that in the past most VNSAs most of the time have shown themselves to be conservative and imitative rather than innovative in their tactics and weapons. 1 On the other hand, it may be even more hazardous to assume that VNSAs will never be able to successfully adopt new technologies, when there exist several historical examples of VNSAs doing just that.
While a large part of the security concern lies in the fact that many emerging technologies render it easier, safer and less costly for non-experts to adopt new weapons and tactics, 2 for several prominent threats-especially those stemming from the potential VNSA use of so-called "weapons of mass destruction"-the process of adoption and deployment as a whole still requires a complex application of knowledge and materials in a practical context. Thus, when it comes to the assessment of such threats, much of the analysis hinges upon being able to accurately judge the desire and capability of adversaries to successfully carry out complex engineering operations.
Yet, the actual process of how and why VNSAs engage in these efforts and the determinants of their success or failure are understudied aspects, at least in terms of systematic comparison across actors, technologies and time periods. A team of researchers at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 2 and Responses to Terrorism (START) therefore came together with the objective of deriving insights regarding the dynamics and outcomes of complex engineering efforts undertaken by VNSAs. This special issue presents the results of a series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to engage in complex engineering tasks, in the hope of informing strategic assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define a complex engineering effort, as undertaken by a VNSA. Thus, for the purposes of this volume, a complex engineering effort by a VNSA is one that involves: There has been almost no discussion in the terrorism, 5 insurgency or organized crime literatures that is specifically directed towards complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, as here defined. However, there is a fair amount of material on both related superordinate and subordinate topics. In a broader sense, a complex engineering effort in the VNSA context will almost always represent a qualitative departure from the status quo operating posture for a particular VNSA, since it is rare (except perhaps in the case of sophisticated IEDs for some rebel groups in places like Iraq) for a VNSA to have "industrialized" its logistical or weapons acquisition systems to the extent that complex efforts become merely incremental changes to a longstanding standard operating procedure. Therefore, complex engineering efforts can usually be situated within the wider topic of VNSA innovation, about which there is a growing literature. 6 Nonetheless, only a subset of VNSA innovations will qualify as complex engineering efforts. Therefore, the extent to which more general findings about VNSA learning and innovation apply to the specific situation of complex engineering efforts, or whether additional dynamics might characterize these efforts, is still an open question.
Similarly, one subset of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs-the potential for them to produce their own high-level chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons-has been extensively discussed, 7 especially in the case of improvised nuclear devices. 4 the narrow technical requirements of the specific weapon type under consideration, with little reference to whether these requirements extend to the topic of complex engineering efforts outside the CBRN realm or to novel, emerging technologies. The decision making and requirements surrounding the construction of as unique a weapon as an improvised nuclear device might very well be sui generis and less applicable to other complex engineering efforts.
Therefore, while existing scholarship can provide a guide for understanding complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, there is still a gap in the understanding of exactly which of the many factors and dynamics identified in the literature on VNSA innovation and WMD development apply in the case of complex engineering efforts, how strongly they act on the process, and whether there are certain factors that become especially salient in the context of complex engineering efforts.
In order to inform our exploration of the topic, we drew on the existing literature described above as a source of insights that might be relevant to investigating VNSA complex engineering efforts, focusing on those that seem most appropriate to the current topic. It should be noted that this is a preliminary investigation and we are not at this stage laying out or formally testing hypotheses. Rather, we seek to identify potentially salient factors and dynamics that can be formally validated by further research. Among the key theories and findings from the broader literature that guided our examination of VNSA complex engineering efforts were the following:
1. relative to other VNSAs, or as an actor on the world stage; 12 and an ideological or psychological need on the part of leaders to engage in technologically sophisticated operations (sometimes referred to as "techno-fetishism"). 13 3. The decision to innovate and/or the process itself can be facilitated by: champions either within or outside the VNSA, 14 demonstration of the technology by 15 and collaboration 16 with other VNSAs (especially those within the same social network); a willingness to learn and experiment; 17 and an overall organizational tolerance for taking risks. 18 4. Having a separate, institutionalized "engineering" or R&D organ within the organization 19 and a safe haven 20 are important factors in both a positive decision to innovate and the ultimate success of innovation adoption attempts. Conversely, intra-organizational discord 21 and pressures from security forces can impede adoption efforts. 22 5. Some technology development efforts can take on their own momentum within an organization, as vested interests for the effort develop. 23 6 6. With respect to obtaining the requisite expertise for innovation, the literature suggests that VNSAs do not necessarily require members with outstanding technical expertise, but instead a membership that is stable, proficient in analyzing existing methods and resources, and can reconfigure these to meet an organization's goals. 24 7. While VNSAs may vary considerably with respect to the value they place on the safety and security of members involved in innovation efforts, key members with technical skills and experience will generally be protected, as their loss can severely diminish a group's capabilities. 25 One feature of existing scholarship is copious discussion of the different pathways by which VNSAs could acquire a WMD capability, such as by theft, transfer from a patron, or purchase on a putative black market. However, in the current context of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, by definition we presume that the bulk of the adoption process consists of internal development activities carried out by group members, with perhaps only raw materials or equipment being procured through other means. Furthermore, the existing literature says relatively little about the process by which a complex engineering task is implemented, other than to prescribe acquiring the necessary knowledge and skills, ensuring adequate funding, equipment and materials, and establishing a development site. There was therefore particular emphasis placed in the current study on the implementation aspects of complex engineering efforts.
The collective insights extracted from related literatures thus led the research team to adopt the following framing questions to shape its exploration of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs:  How are obstacles dealt with?
 Why do these attempts either succeed or fail?
Methodology
Given that there is little to no prior research on complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, it is appropriate to examine the topic in an exploratory fashion. 26 This approach places less emphasis on controlling for certain variables or comparing both positive and negative cases, as would be necessary if the objective was to test an existing theory. Therefore, in order to gain from our preliminary analysis as much direction as possible regarding where to steer future research, we focused on those cases where complex engineering tasks had at least been attempted, leaving more complicated comparative analyses 27 to later studies. Similarly, we sought to gain as much variety in temporal, geographic and cultural context between cases as possible, in order to more easily and accurately identify organizational factors fundamentally associated with the decision to engage in complex engineering tasks and the successful completion of such tasks.
8 Upon further research, one case (ETA's production of a remote-controlled vehicle) was quickly excluded because it was likely apocryphal and based on a mistranslation of news reports. Any candidate for which there was not a high degree of confidence of sufficiently detailed information being available in the open sources was also dropped from consideration. The remaining cases were prioritized in terms of the degree to which they met the definition of a complex engineering effort provided above, judged subjectively on a 1 to 5 scale. This was measured against the complexity of the task that was attempted, irrespective of the extent to which the actor succeeded. Thus, Aum Shinrikyo's attempts to produce a nuclear weapon, even though these never progressed beyond the embryonic stage, receive the highest rating given the inherent complexity of actually constructing an improvised nuclear device.
Also, for tasks where the complexity varies across subcategories of weapon or technology pursued, the rating is based on the specific type actually pursued by the VNSA. So, for example, since al-Qaida and Hamas only pursued relatively primitive chemical agents (such as cyanide), their efforts receive a lower rating than the chemical weapons exploits of Aum Shinrikyo, which pursued more sophisticated agents like sarin and VX. Similarly, while submersibles can range across multiple levels of complexity, those pursued by FARC, which included integrated and advanced propulsion, navigation and life support systems, receive a higher rating. 30 In order to explore the most clear-cut instances of complex engineering efforts, it was decided to only consider cases scoring 4 or 5. This left the cases in the highlighted rows in The cases selected for this study were therefore:
1. The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the development of advanced mortar systems.
2. Aum Shinrikyo's chemical and nuclear weapons programs (combined into a single case).
3. The production of submersibles and submarines by FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).
4. The Los Zetas transnational criminal organizations' construction and maintenance of an expansive radio communication network across Mexico.
5. Hamas and the construction of attack tunnel networks from Gaza into Israel.
These five cases span six different types of engineering activity, three types of organization (terrorist, criminal and hybrid), four regions, and each decade from the 1970s to the present, thus providing ample variety in terms of context. While researching possible cases, researchers also noted the importance of the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology smuggling network.
Although not itself qualifying as a complex engineering effort, the evolution and activities of this network provide a stark illustration of one avenue by which violent non-state actors might gain access to the sophisticated technology and expertise required for a particular complex engineering effort. It was therefore decided to conduct a sixth case study on the A.Q. Khan saga, which, although differing from the other five, demonstrates how illicit networks might facilitate a violent non-state actor's complex engineering efforts.
The research team then assigned one or more authors to each case, based on prior expertise and interest. This was followed by the data collection phase, which comprised extensive research of the open sources, including books, journal articles, government reports and news reports. This was supplemented in several cases by interviews with experts having intimate regarded it as sufficient to focus on the cult's chemical and nuclear programs, the former effort regarded as at least a qualified engineering success and the latter an abject failure.
